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THE VALIDITY OF TRANSNATIONAL TECHNICAL
KNOW-HOW LICENSING AGREEMENTS IN
THE UNITED STATES COURTS
Though many criteria have affected the decision of whether
or not a United States company should participate in a foreign
know-how licensing program, a new basic factor is the possibility
that a transnational technical know-how licensing agreement will
not be recognized by the United States courts. In January of
1970, the Antitrust Division of the United States Justice Depart-
ment organized a special "Patent Unit". The stated purpose of the
Patent Unit is to handle "litigation involving restrictive practices
in licensing of patents and technology."' The drawing of a distinc-
tion between patents and technology may signal a readiness of the
Justice Department to challenge the protection which has previ-
ously been afforded know-how in the United States courts.
This Comment discusses some of the circumstances that may
affect the probability of judicial recognition of know-how licensing
agreements in the United States courts. In general, judicial rec-
ognition of know-how licensing agreements is determined by the
courts interpretation of where the balance point should be located
between the concepts of protection of a property interest in know-
how and that of not permitting parties to maintain an interest in
industrial intellectual property beyond the limits established by the
United States Congress. Two recent decisions of the United
States courts, Lear v. Adkins and Painton and Co. v. Bourns, Inc.,
may greatly affect the probability of judicial recognition of know-
how licensing agreements. 2 Prior to a discussion of these cases
and their significance to drafters of transnational know-how li-
censing agreements, the terminology relating to know-how and
patent agreements, the scope of the United States patent laws and
their relationship to general antitrust concepts, the nature and use
of transnational technical know-how licensing agreements, the de-
veloping law of know-how protection, and the cases leading up
to Lear and Painton may be profitably examined.
1. Department of Justice Press Release of January 6, 1970.
2. Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 162 U.S.P.Q. 1 (1969); Painton and Co.
v. Bourns, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 271, 164 U.S.P.Q. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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I. TERMINOLOGY
Some of the difficulties in dealing with know-how licensing
agreements can be traced to the use of vague terminology. In re-
gard to the transfer of property rights, assignment, as used herein,
means a total disposition of the right or rights tranferred. A trans-
fer of rights in intellectual property that does not amount to an
assignment is a license.' While the expression, "know-how", is a
convenient generic term to describe a variety of different matters,
it does not adequately delineate protectable subject matter.
Know-how is much broader than, and includes, that information
commonly referred to as "trade secrets." Know-how is often used
to describe such diverse items as formulae, drawings, patterns,
company records, specifications, product and process manuals,
quality control techniques, details of shop technique and technical
training given to employees, and the experience and craftsman-
ship of technicians. It is the aggregate of information essential to
the functioning of the company as a competitive unit in the indus-
try. It should be noted that know-how encompasses both in-
ventions which are patentable but not patented, and innovations
incapable of being patented because they do not rise to the level
of invention set by the United States patent law.
II. THE SCOPE OF THE U.S. PATENT LAWS AND THEIR
RELATION TO THE ANTITRUST LAWS
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution author-
izes Congress to promote the progress of science and the useful
arts by granting exclusive rights to inventors.4 Exercising this
power, the United States Congress enacted the Patent Act.5 The
Patent Act, in Section 101, grants eligibility for patent protection
to inventors of new and useful processes, machines, manufactures
or compositions of matter. To be eligible for patent protection an
invention may not be subject matter that as a whole would have
been obvious, at the time the invention was made, to a person hav-
ing ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.6
3. WALKER, DELLER'S EDITION OF WALKER ON PATENTS 366, at 1439-
1460 (1937); see also W. SURREY & C. SHAW, A LAWYERS GUIDE TO INTER-
NATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 130-146 (general discussion of transnational
licensing terminology), 167-169 (sample know-how licensing agreement) (1963).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
5. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1964), as amended, 35 U.S.C. §§ 41-288 (Supp.
V, 1970) [hereinafter referred to as the Patent Act].
6. Patent Act § 103 (1964); see also Patent Act §§ 100-104 (1964).
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Assuming the proper and timely disclosure of an eligible invention
in a patent application, the applicant receives the right to exclude
all others from making, using or selling the invention throughout
the United States for a term of seventeen years.7 Any infringer of
a valid patent may be enjoined from further infringement and is
subject to the payment of damages.8 The right to license a patent
and receive royalty payments is authorized by the Patent Act and
has widespread case law support.9 In Section 271(d), the Act
provides that "no patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for in-
fringement or contributory infringement of a patent shall be de-
nied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the
patent right by reason of his having . . . derived revenue from
acts . . . [or] licensed or authorized another to perform acts
which if performed without his consent would constitute contribu-
tory infringement of the patent.
Since the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890, the
federal courts have sought to reconcile that Act with the Patent
Act. On the one hand, the Sherman Act states that "[e]very
contract . . . in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is hereby de-
clared to be illegal . . .",10 and that "[elvery person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of...
trade or commerce . . . shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.
9'1 On the other hand, the main feature of a patent is the
power it confers upon its holder to exclude others from making, us-
ing or selling the patented invention. The granting of patents is
based upon the belief that this exception to antitrust policy actually
serves free competition by stimulating invention through the crea-
tion of rewards for invention, creating economic protection in
areas of high initial investment costs, effecting full disclosure of
scientific progress, and by stimulating new ideas and the cross fer-
tilization of such ideas.
It is important for our later analysis to note that licensing is
a partial release of the patentee's legally recognized monopoly po-
sition. By licensing the invention, a patentee permits someone else
7. Patent Act § 154 (1964), as amended (Supp. V, 1970).
8. Id. at §§ 283-85; see Brand Plastics, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Co., 168
U.S.P.Q. 133 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
9. Turner, Patents, Antitrust and Innovation, 28 U. PITT. L. REv. 151
(1966).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
11. Id. at § 2 .
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to produce the invention. As the number of licensees increases,
the number of competitors and products utilizing the invention in-
creases. This results in a cross fertilization of ideas, a more wide-
spread utilization of the invention, and a consequent reduction in
the patentee's monopoly position, i.e., his legally recognized ex-
emption from the antitrust laws.
III. THE NATURE AND USE OF TRANSNATIONAL TECHNICAL
KNow-How LICENSING AGREEMENTS
There is a widespread practice of licensing know-how analo-
gous to patent licensing. This practice has arisen because the ac-
cumulation of information and its integration into a competitive
operation generally requires significant expenditures of time and
capital. By licensing a proven process and the penumbra of know-
how, a company can establish itself as a manufacturer with a mini-
mum of the trials and failure that are inherent in entering a new
field of endeavor. An agreement to supply know-how may be
the primary basis of a transaction. On the other hand, it may be
a mere appendage to a principle agreement involving patents,
copyrighted designs, and trademarks. Though licensing agree-
ments generally consist of a combination of intellectual property
rights, the most prevalent element in licensing appears to be know-
how.
1 2
During the last decade, the use of transnational technical
know-how licensing agreements has been increasing rapidly as a
growing number of United States companies have responded to
demands from abroad for technology and know-how. Many
United States firms have seen know-how licensing as a means of
producing income and of augmenting export sales and investment
programs. 13 Some United States companies specialize in know-
how licensing due to a disinclination to commit large amounts of
capital abroad. 4 Such licensors depend primarily on continued
development to maintain their know-how lead.' 5 Other firms
commonly contract to supply the necessary know-how for the con-
struction and subsequent operation of manufacturing plants. Such
12. Lightman, Compensation Patterns in U.S. Foreign Licensing, 14 IDEA
2 (1970).
13. Id.
14. W. FRIEDMAN & G. KALMANOFF, JOINT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VEN-
TURES 152 (1961).
15. National Industrial Conference Board, 1 Foreign Licensing Agreements
20 (1958).
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contracts for the supply of know-how often provide for the con-
sideration given to be in the form of royalties on goods manu-
factured through utilization of the transferred know-how."8 This
commercial activity has favorably affected the United States bal-
ance of trade. Foreign licensing income to United States busi-
nesses amounted to slightly over one billion dollars for 1964, one
billion, one hundred and thirty-six million dollars for 1967, and
over one and a quarter billion dollars for 1968.1"
IV. THE DEVELOPING LAW OF KNOW-HOW PROTECTION
There is a discernable trend, both in the United States and
abroad, to recognize a property right in know-how."8 In 1961,
the International Chamber of Commerce, following a study of
the laws and practices of various countries relating to the prob-
lems associated with the protection of know-how internationally,
concluded, in part, that:
[t]echnological improvements developed by business enter-
prises whether patentable or not, commonly referred to as
know-how, have become. . . tremendously valuable subjects
of industrial property supplementing patents and other rights
. . . , and are the subject matter of an increasing number of
very important agreements between business enterprises.
The protection of know-how . . . is therefore a keenly
felt need if the communication of know-how between enter-
prise-s to promote economic and technical progress is to be
encouraged .... 19
Know-how has been recognized by the United States courts
as a type of property which can be sold, assigned, licensed, taxed
and exchanged for equity in a company.2" Protection of know-
16. See W. SURREY & C. SHAW, A LAWYERS GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 130-146 (1963).
17. Based on figures published by the United States Department of Com-
merce; see Lightman, supra note 12.
18. Fetterley, Historical Perspectives on Criminal Laws Relating to the
Theft of Trade Secrets, 25 Bus. LAWYER 1535 (1970); see European Economic
Community Anti-Trust Law, Art. 4(2)(ii)(b) of Regulation No. 17; see also
Von Notten, Know-How Licensing in the Common Market, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV.
525, 531 (1963).
19. International Chamber of Commerce, Statements and Resolutions
1959-1961, at 98-99; see International Chamber of Commerce Document No.
450/198 (December 27, 1960); see also Newcomer, Legal Protection and Licens-
ing of Know-How Internationally, 7 AM. Bus. L.J. 227 (interpretation of the
Resolution adopted by the International Chamber of Commerce) (1970).
20. Nash, The Concept of Property in Know-How, 6 PAT. TRDMK. COPY.
J. 289, 294, 295 (1962).
Vol. 2
5
Root: Validity of Transnational Technical Know-How Licensing Agreements
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1971
TRANSNATIONAL TECHNICAL KNOW-How LICENSING
how cases have generally arisen in regard to contract rights and
protection has usually been given through the enforcement of those
rights. The conduct prohibited is essentially the economic in-
terference with an advantageous competitive position of the plain-
tiff represented by the value of the know-how to the plaintiff.
Remedies have been given where the courts have found such a
relationship between the parties as to make it unfair for the de-
fendant to appropriate, misuse or divulge, without authorization
from the owner, know-how information communicated by the
owner to the defendant or obtained without authorization of the
owner. 
2
V. THE PREEMPTION-PUBLIC DOMAIN DOCTRINE PRIOR TO
LEAR V. ADKINS
In both Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.2 2 and Compco
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting Co.,23 a patentee brought suit alleging
infringement and unfair competition because the defendants were
producing lighting fixtures which were substantially similar to
those covered by the plaintiff's design patent. In both cases the
patents involved were declared invalid. Nevertheless, the defend-
ants were enjoined from selling the products by the state courts on
the ground that the likelihood of confusion as to the source of the
products resulted in unfair competition. The Supreme Court re-
versed, holding in both cases that a state may not prohibit simula-
tion of unpatented articles because such prohibitions conflict with
the federal patent policy. 24 The Supreme Court used the public
21. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 499(c) (1967); N.J. REv. STAT. 2A:
119-5.1 (Cum. Supp. 1965); see also Fetterley, Historical Perspectives on Crimi-
nal Laws Relating to the Theft of Trade Secrets, 25 Bus. LAWYER 1535, at 1538
(1970); see for 1909 German Law of Unfair Competition, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PATENT PRACTICE AND INVENTION MANAGEMENT 497, 499, 507 (R. Calvert
ed. 1964); DuPont Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917) (Justice
Holmes: "The word 'property' as applied to trade secrets is an unanalyzed ex-
pression of certain secondary consequences of the primary fact that the law
makes so rudimentary requirements of good faith.")
22. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
23. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
24. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. It was stated in Stilfel, 376 U.S. at 231-
32 that: "Obviously a State could not, consistently with the Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution, extend the life of a patent beyond its expiration date or give a
patent on an article which lacked the level of invention required for federal
patents. . . . Just as a State cannot encroach upon the federal patent law di-
rectly, it cannot, under some other law, such as that forbidding unfair com-
petition, give protection of a kind that clashes with the objectives of the federal
patent laws."
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domain notion that anything not protected by patent, copyright or
trademark, may be copied to prevent courts from applying state
law of unfair competition, where the result of such application
would be to grant monopolies to manufacturers of unpatentable
products.2 . In determining that the state law of unfair competi-
tion must give way to the federal interest in free competition, the
Court reasoned that Congress had promulgated a comprehensive
national legislative program for the administration of the patent
system.26 Compco and Stiffel, by resting on preemption, held
that the state law could not be the basis of monopoly powers simi-
lar to those conferred by the Patent Act.27  Justice Harlan, how-
ever, in his concurring opinion to Compco, suggested that state
unfair competition law was not preempted when its purpose was
to prevent predatory business practices.
The Stiffel and Compco cases were generally viewed by
state and federal district courts as not being conclusive in deter-
mining the viability of know-how protection on the basis that the
issue of inequitable behavior in obtaining the design was not pres-
ent in either case and that copied articles were readily obtainable
by the general public.2" Prior to Lear v. Adkins, in spite of the
Stiffel and Compco decisions, few persons questioned the fact
that know-how could be licensed for consideration. However,
when Lear v. Adkins was handed down by the Supreme Court of
the United States, considerable concern was expressed by mem-
bers of the know-how licensing field. It was speculated that com-
ments in the dissenting opinion might be the harbinger of a re-
juvinated attack by the federal judiciary upon the developing law of
know-how licensing.29
VI. LEAR V. ADKINS3
0
Adkins, an inventor, was hired by Lear to develop a gyro-
scope of improved accuracy for use in aircraft navigation systems.
25. A comprehensive analysis of the Compco & Stiffel cases is presented
in Treece, Patent Policy and Preemption: The Stiffel and Compco Cases, 32 U.
OF Cm. L. REV. 80 (1964).
26. 376 U.S. at 228-30.
27. Treece, supra note 25, at 96.
28. Milbank, Finders Keepers, Licensors Weepers, 52 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y
353 (1970).
29. Turner, U.S. Antitrust Laws and Territorial Provisions in Licensing
Foreign Patents and Know-How for Foreign Use, 24 REcoRD 512 (1969).
30. 395 U.S. 653, 162 U.S.P.Q. 1 (1969).
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After two years of work, Adkins succeeded in developing a satis-
factory device. Lear then began using Adkins' device in produc-
tion. Adkins filed a patent application on his improvements and
entered into negotiations with Lear to conclude a licensing agree-
ment. After three years, an agreement was reached under which
Lear undertook to pay Adkins royalties for his improvements. The
patent was issued eight years after the application had been filed and
five years after Lear agreed to pay royalties on the use of the inven-
tion embodied in the patient application. As long as three years be-
fore the patent was issued, Lear refused to pay royalties to Adkins
for the use of his ideas. Upon issuance of his patent, Adkins
brought an action to obtain payment of back royalties. In re-
sponse, Lear successfully challenged the validity of Adkins' patent.
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Harlan, held
that technical knowledge in general circulation is open to utiliza-
tion by anyone, except where it is protected by a valid and unex-
pired patent. As a result of this holding, the date of issuance of
a patent bars a claim for royalties for use of the invention there-
after where the patent is subsequently found to be invalid. The
Supreme Court noted the difference in the status of claims for
royalties arising from the use of the invention during the period
preceeding the issuance of the invalid patent. However, the Su-
preme Court expressly refrained from spelling out the applicable
federal principles which state courts should apply in deciding this
issue. The Supreme Court stated that it should not attempt to
define, even in a limited way, the scope of the state's power to
enforce contractual rights of unpatented secret ideas. 3 1 Three Jus-
tices dissented, in part, on the basis that not state could "authorize
any kind of monopoly" by which a "self-styled inventor" could
collect royalties for disclosing his know-how. With Chief Justice
Warren and Justice Douglas concurring, Justice Black said that
agreements under which a licensor can obtain royalties on his
innovation while his patent application is pending are invalid:
I still entertain the belief I expressed for the Court in Stiffel
and Compco that no State had a right to authorize any kind
of monopoly on what is claimed to be a new invention, except
when a patent has been obtained from the Patent Office under
the exacting standard of the patent laws. One who makes a
discovery may, of course, keep it secret if he wishes, but pri-
vate arrangements under which self-styled 'inventors' do not
31. Id. at 675.
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keep their discoveries secret, but rather disclose them in re-
turn for contractual payments, run counter to the plan of our
patent laws, which tightly regulate the kind of invention that
may be protected and the manner in which they may be pro-
tected. The national policy expressed in the patent laws,
favoring free competition and narrowly limiting monopoly,
cannot be frustrated by private agreements among individuals,
with or without the approval of the State. 3 2
In spite of the dicta appearing in the dissent of Lear v. Ad-
kinS3 to the effect that all know-how licensing agreements are in-
valid, the Justice Department's special Patent Unit of the Anti-
trust Division has not sought to invalidate all know-how licenses.
Although the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department has not
seen fit to launch an all-out attack on know-how licensing, Judge
Motley of the Southern District Court of New York decided that
such an attack was overdue. If the decision that Judge Motley
handed down in Painton and Co. v. Bourns, Inc. indicates the in-
terpretation that state courts may give the Lear v. Adkins case,
it heralds the demise of know-how agreements in the absence of
remedial legislation.
VII. PAINTON AND CO. v. BOURNS, INC. 34
The transnational know-how licensing agreement which was
the bone of contention in the Painton case had a provision for the
payment of royalties on unpatented articles manufactured utilizing
licensed know-how. The court refused to enforce the transna-
tional agreement and commented as follows:
Our patent policy of strict regulation of inventions would be
undercut if inventors could enforce agreements for compensa-
tion for alleged secret ideas without being required to submit
those ideas to the Patent Office, and thereby, eventually have
the ideas disclosed to the public. Furthermore, patent policy
(reaffirmed by the holding in Lear . . . . Lear at 656-71)
which allows compensation only for ideas which rise to the
level of invention would be further undermined by the enforce-
ment of such a contract, since compensation would be awarded
for non-inventions ....
For these reasons, this court holds that federal patent law re-
32. Id. at 677.
33. BNA ANTrrRuST & TRADE REG. REPT. No. 411 at 10-11, 21-23
(May 27, 1969).
34. 309 F. Supp. 271, 164 U.S.P.Q. 595 (1970).
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quires an inventor to submit his ideas to the Patent Office
before he can compel consideration for the use of his idea
35
In view of the fact that the Painton holding was sui sponte, 3
it seems unlikely that the decision could have been made with
due consideration for the important domestic and international so-
cial and economic factors involved. It would appear, in light of
the important social and economic impact of such a holding as was
handed down in Painton v. Bourns, that at least a token respect
to the adversary system was needed to ensure a minimal exposure
to the opposing views on the part of the presiding Justice. It
should be noted in this regard that through three dissenting Su-
preme Court Justices in the Lear v. Adkins case declared that the
State courts could not enforce their laws with regard to know-how
agreements, the Justices in the majority opinion specifically re-
frained from specifying any applicable federal principles in this
area. Such restraint in instituting sweeping changes was not felt
by Judge Motley, however, as she sought to make a radical depar-
ture from the law applicable to know-how agreements.
The principle thesis of the dissenting opinion in the Lear
case and of Judge Motley's opinion in the Painton case was that
to allow the licensing of trade secrets would be to permit a viola-
tion of the public policy manifest in the United States Patent
Code, i.e., that to allow "self-styled inventors" to obtain remun-
eration for the use of their ideas without making them a part of
the public record undermines the patent policy of the United States.
To facilitate the examination of this thesis, a distinction should
first be made between know-how which is patentable and that
which is not patentable. If the public policy factor to be ad-
vanced is that of bringing new ideas into the public domain
through the issuance of patents, it can only be furthered with re-
gard to those ideas which are patentable. As a consequence, the
argument does not apply to know-how comprised of unpatent-
able innovations and accumulations of data and experience. To
say that "self-styled inventors" can not obtain payment for re-
vealing their ideas to another because knowledge in the public do-
main is available for use by all members of the public without
charge is equivalent to saying that a fisherman may not obtain
35. Id. at 274.
36. See C. Willian, Clinic on Unfair Trade Practices Relating to Industrial-
Intellectual Property, 14 IDEA 414 (1970).
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payment for a fish he has caught because anyone who might want
to buy such a fish could have caught it himself. The obvious af-
fect of such a holding would be that there would no longer be an
economic incentive for fishing. Similarly, there would no longer
be an economic incentive for those individuals of exceptional tal-
ent and ability to search for those bits which, when integrated,
comprise the knowledge necessary for operation of an economi-
cally competitive manufacturing process. There is obvious merit
in the contention that permitting the licensing of information that
is patentable frustrates the public policy embodied in the Patent
Act. However, the enforcement of know-how agreements em-
bodying patentable know-how does not give the licensor a mo-
nopoly in that information. Such an incursion on public policy
may be justifiable. Other members, or potential members of the
industry, are free to develop and accumulate the same know-how
to enable them to effectively compete with the licensor. The only
way that a licensor can be assured that he will remain competitive
in the industry and have know-how that other members of the in-
dustry will wish to license from him is through continued research
and development. The creation of a competitor in the industry,
the rapid obsolescence of technical know-how and an environ-
ment within which secrets are difficult to keep because of the con-
stant flux of employees between employers, generally makes the
lifetime of secret know-how a short one. To refuse to enforce
know-how agreements is to place an obstacle in the path of com-
panies who would increase the compass of those individuals pos-
sessing the know-how and consequently retard its filtering out-
ward through the industry. Without the possibility of economic
return, there would be no motivation for a company possessing
know-how to reveal it to anyone. Rather than fostering the
public policy of encouraging the spread of information, the dis-
couraging of the use of know-how agreements would retard such
dissemination.
A company having a patentable innovation, an invention, al-
ready has sufficient motivation to seek a patent on that invention
under the United States Patent Code. By obtaining a patent on the
idea, the company can monopolize the use of that idea, with the
sanction of the Federal Government, for a period of seventeen
years. No added motivation for seeking patents, in the form of
refusal to enforce know-how agreements, is justified in the light
Vol. 2
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of the adverse effects that such a policy would have both domesti-
cally and internationally.
VIII. SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR DRAFTSMEN TO AVOID
LEAR V. ADKINS AND PAINTON V. BOURNS, INC.
Until legislation obviating Lear and Painton becomes a real-
ity and accumulates a degree of judicial precedent concerning its
interpretation, drafters of know-how agreements should consider
techniques to avoid the possibility of judicial non-recognition of
such agreements. Several conflicting recommendations have ap-
peared in recent literature.37  Utilization of a choice of law or
forum clause, or submission of disputes to arbitration are means by
which judicial nonrecognition of a know-how licensing agreement
might be avoided.
In the field of international arbitration, the United States has
joined a growing movement favoring the conclusion of treaties de-
signed to assure validation and specific performance of arbitration
agreements, as well as the enforcement of awards recovered by
virtue of such agreements, unless contrary to strong public policy. 8
Both federal and state courts must apply the United States Arbi-
tration Act 39 to transactions involving foreign commerce."0 The
Act makes valid, irrevocable, and enforceable an agreement of ar-
bitration. The risk of non-enforceability of an arbitration award
in foreign jurisdictions is considerably less than the risk in Ameri-
can jurisdictions. However, some reluctance on the part of foreign
courts to enforce arbitration awards favoring United States com-
panies may be expected to arise if the United States courts follow
a policy of refusing to enforce arbitration awards favoring foreign
companies. Utilization of arbitration poses a problem of prevent-
ing the general disclosure of the accumulated know-how to the in-
37. PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT SECTION OF THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, COMMITTEE REPORT, 29 JouRNAL OF PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPY-
RIGHT SECTION OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 217 (Nov. 1970); see also
Newcomer, supra note 19, at 237-238.
38. See generally Comment, United States Foreign Arbitral Awards Con-
vention: United States Accession, 2 CALIF. WEST. INT'L L.J. 67, for a complete
treatment of U.S. international arbitration legislation; see also Domke, Arthur
Nussbaum, The Pioneer of International Commercial Arbitration, 57 COL. L.
REV. 8 (1957); Benjamin, The Work of the Economic Commission for Europe
in the Field of International Commercial Arbitration, 7 INT. COMP. L.Q. 22
(1958).
39. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1970).
40. Reynold Jamaica Mines v. Societe Navale Caennaise, 239 F.2d 689
(4th Cir. 1956).
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dustrial community. Because of the need for preserving the se-
crecy of know-how, the courts have devised a procedure to pre-
vent publication as a result of litigation. The judicial solution
was for the parties to agree on an expert, or a small list of experts,
to whom disclosures could be made on behalf of the court.41 A
similar procedure should be provided for in any agreement con-
templating the resolution of disputes by submission to arbitration.
A number of recent cases have held that the parties can con-
trol the forum within which their agreement may be adjudicated by
the use of a choice of forum clause.42 These cases upholding
the parties' choice of forum clause are in accord with the practice
generally followed in civil law countries.43 However, a number of
difficulties attendant to the utilization of a choice of foreign forum
clause, such as a lack of familiarity with the foreign law and the
difficulties inherent in litigation in a foreign forum, may make
this alternative unattractive to many United States companies.
The use of a choice of law clause raises an issue of party
autonomy, i.e., whether the court should give effect to express
declarations by the parties that the validity of the agreement should
be determined by applying the rules of another forum. There is
no general agreement, either among the courts or the legal schol-
ars, whether or not party autonomy should be permitted with re-
gard to the validity of the agreement. A leading text in the field
of conflicts finds "authorities . . . in great confusion, with all
rules supported by authority."44  This situation has arisen because
the courts have resorted to a plethora of techniques in attempts to
achieve justice. For example, the courts have resorted to the de-
vices of "remedy"4 and "public policy",46 have indulged in
presumptions in the "absence of proof" of foreign law, 47 and have
41. Amber Size & Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Menzel, 2 Ch. 239, 30 R.P.C.
433 (1913).
42. Takemura v. The S.S. Tsuneshima Maru, 197 F. Supp. 909 (S.D.N.Y.
1961); Skins Trading Corp. v. The S.S. Punta Del Este, 180 F. Supp. 609
(S.D.N.Y. 1960); Nieto v. The S.S. Tinnum, 170 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
43. Peterson, Conflict Avoidance Through Choice of Law and Forum,
45 DENVER L.J. 20 (1968).
44. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 321 (1949); see Lewis v. Jackson &
Squire, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 354, 360 (1949).
45. Reed v. Kelly, 177 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1949).
46. Kronstein, Crisis of "Conflict of Laws," 37 GEo. L.J. 483, 506-12
(1949).
47. See, e.g., Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Consolidated Fisheries Co., 190
F.2d 817 (3rd Cir. 1951); see also A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 129 (1962).
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evolved special rules for special purposes.4" In regard to the law
applicable to determine the basic validity of agreements, there is
such divergence in the decisions involving conflicts of laws and
party autonomy that virtually any United States court can find lo-
cal authority for holding either way in regard to whether or not
foreign law should be applied. In international conflicts cases,
United States courts have been more willing to give predominance
to their own invalidating law than they have been inclined to do
in interstate cases. 49  International agreements affecting the na-
tional economy fall into a class where this is particularly notice-
able."0 The accentuation of such trends, however, logically leads
to the rise of legal self defense as embodied in manifestations of
state sovereign power. The validity or invalidity of a commercial
agreement should result from fixed rules of law.5 A Rule of Val-
idation has been suggested for such agreements. 52 The Rule of Val-
idation would uphold the agreement if it satisfies the law of any
place with which it has a substantial connection, unless perfor-
mance at the place selected for performance is prohibited.53 The
adoption of such a Rule of Validation would be consistent with
permitting party autonomy regarding choice of law. Resort to
the Rule of Validation by the courts, would only be necessary in
the absence of a stipulation in the agreement as to the applicable
law. Permitting party autonomy would have the advantage of
greater certainty of contract with less chance for misunderstanding
between the parties.
Ultimately, the degree of freedom allowed individuals in their
agreements depends upon political considerations. 4 It has been
argued that permitting party autonomy in choice of validiating
law involves a delegation of sovereign power to individuals.55
48. Lorenzen, Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws,
30 YALE L.J. 565, 655, 673; 31 YALE L.J. 53 (1920-21).
49. See Miltenberg & Samton, Inc., v. Mallor, 1 A.D.2d 458, 151 N.Y.S.2d
748 (1956); see also Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261, 277 (1880); see
also Sunbeam Corp. v. Masters of Miami, Inc., 225 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1955);
see also Cabot, Exchange Control and the Conflict of Laws: An Unsolved
Puzzle, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 476, 496 (1951).
50. Yntema, "Autonomy" in Choice of Law, 1 AM. J. CoMP. L. 341
(1952); Kronstein, supra note 46, at 512.
51. Lorenzen, supra note 48, at 658.
52. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 47, at §§ 175-184.
53. STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS, 238-239 (1951).
54. Yntema, supra note 50, at 341.
55. R. HEILMAN, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDs
96 (1961); Goodrich, supra note 44 at 326.
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However, if the law were that the parties could select the law
that should determine the legal significance of their acts, then
the parties would not be legislating or exercising sovereign power
in designating the manner in which the court should interpret their
acts." In a domestic case, the parties may be precluded from
avoiding by agreement, an invalidating prohibition or proscription
of the local forum for purposes of enforcing the public policy un-
derlying the requirement. It does not follow that such enforce-
ment should be insisted upon, as in the case of Painton and Co. v.
Bourns, Inc., where either a party to the agreement, the place
where made, or where it is to be performed is foreign. A diminu-
tion of the concept of autonomy of the will of the parties is in-
consistent with the goal of an international community of justice.
The economic and concomitant social growth of the world com-
munity, being served by transnational commercial transactions,
necessitates the integration of the private law of nations into a
common legal order. The United States courts, in adjudicating
transnational disputes, are in a unique position to put into prac-
tice the principles of mutual respect for the social and legal sys-
tems of other peoples of the world community. In adjudicating
the rights of parties to transnational agreements, the courts should
not lose sight of the guiding principle of all civilized societies
which forms the basis of our legal systems; a respect for the rights
of other members of society. Mutual respect for the rights of the
citizens of all nations demands that the courts recognize the law
which will validate commercial agreements, in the absence of a
stipulation by the parties, and the right of the parties to specify the
governing law in transnational agreements.
IX. THE NEED FOR CURATIVE LEGISLATION
Curative legislation is needed to dispel the inference of
Lear, divert the affect of Painton upon the developing law of
know-how protection, and assure the basic validity of know-how
agreements. The Patent, Trademark and Copyright section of
the American Bar Association is on record as favoring such legis-
lation to obviate the Lear case. 57 Legislation proposed by Sena-
tors McClellan and Scott would prevent the Patent Code from
being read to "pre-empt or otherwise affect in any way" state-
created rights or obligations in inventions, whether or not pat-
56. HEILMAN, supra note 55, at 96.
57. S. 2756, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 301 (McClellan) (1969).
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entable. '  The legislation proposed by Senators Scott and Mc-
Clellan does not address itself to the problem of making patentable
know-how available to the public through publication, as inven-
tions are made available upon publication of patents. However,
the legislation of the Senators does forstall an attack on know-how
licensing based upon public policy as manifest in the United States
Patent Act.
X. A KNOW-How REGISTRATION PROGRAM
A study is needed to determine if there is such a significant
difference between the rate at which information becomes available
to the public through the issuance of a patent, as opposed to
the rate at which the public learns of unpatentable know-how,
as to justify a distinction between them by the courts. If pa-
tentable ideas, embodied in present know-how licensing agree-
ments, disseminate too slowly throughout the industry, then to
swell the larder of public knowledge, a know-how registration
program could be established. The United States Patent Office is
the logical governmental agency under which a branch could be
created to carry out such a program. However, the creation of a
know-how registration branch would necessitate a large increase in
the budget of the Patent Department and would entail a signifi-
cant added measure of expense to licensors of know-how.
If a thorough study showed that a know-how registration
program could be justified, it could be made a requirement that
to make that portion of an agreement regarding patentable know-
how enforceable, the parties must first register the agreement and
submit copies of all relevant technical material transmitted under
the know-how agreement to a federal governmental agency. A
federal statute instituting such a registration requirement should
distinguish between know-how agreements embodying patentable
know-how and those which do not cover such know-how to de-
crease the burden upon the governmental agency. Placing a bur-
den of registration upon the parties, under the onus of non-enforce-
ment of unregistered agreements incorporating patentable know-
how, would require a determination by the licensor as to the patent-
ability of such innovations. Examiners could also be designated
to examine the registered know-how. If portions of it were found
to be patentable, publication of the patentable portion of the know-
58. S. 2756, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (McClellan) (1969); S. 2756, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 56 amend. 578 (Scott) (1970).
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how would be made by the registration branch of the Patent Of-
fice, after the expiration of a time period, upon the authorization
of the judiciary. The possibility of such publication occurring
without patent protection to the registrant would place a further
burden of initial recognition of potential inventions upon the regis-
trant. So allotting this burden would force the registrant to seek
patents where they would be potentially obtainable and thus de-
crease the work load on the know-how examiners. It presents a
serious problem when know-how, though patentable, would not be
patented by the licensor because a patent would not enable the
patentee to effectively protect his interest in the invention. Utili-
zation of a two-stage time period might be considered to resolve
the major problems inherent in publication of patentable know-
how which could not be effectively protected by a patent. The
time period could have, as the first stage, a time limit within which
a registrant would be able to interrupt the process leading to pub-
lication through the filing of a patent on the invention embodied
in the know-how agreement. If the registrant failed to make ap-
plication for such a patent within the first stage of the time period,
the patentable know-how would be published by the registration
branch after the termination of the second stage of the time period
upon authorization of the judiciary. The length of the second
stage being determined by weighing the relative merits of placing
the information in the public domain and of encouraging licensing
of the invention to permit the discoverer of the idea a reasonable
time within which to recover research and development expendi-
tures and make a reasonable profit through exploitation of the in-
vention.
XI. CONCLUSION
Curative legislation is needed to assure the validity of know-
how agreements. Further study is needed to determine whether
attempts to distinguish patentable and unpatentable know-how,
and a know-how registration program based upon such a distinc-
tion, could be justified.
Until the United States law becomes more settled in the field
of technical know-how licensing, United States companies should
proceed cautiously in entering into know-how licensing agreements.
Prudence dictates that the licensing policy be one of restraint be-
cause of the risk that control over valuable know-how may be lost.
If a decision is reached to license know-how, the drafters of
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the licensing agreement should consider specifying that disputes
in regard to the agreement are to be settled by adjudication in a
foreign forum under foreign law and/or that disputes are to be
resolved by submission to arbitration. If foreign litigation or ar-
bitration clauses are included in the agreement, then procedures to
be followed should be included to ensure protection of the confi-
dentiality of the know-how.
Christopher G. Root
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